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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/05/2006

Accident number: 175

Accident time: 08:00

Accident Date: 05/12/1996

Where it occurred: Road 696, Banteay
Meanchey Province

Country: Cambodia

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: none

Date of main report: [No date recorded]
Name of source: CMAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
electromagnetic
grass/grazing area

Date record created: 14/02/2004

Date last modified: 14/02/2004

No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
disciplinary action against victim (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer may have been resting [it
is believed that the group operated in three-man teams at this time].
This accident was recorded as having occurred on 6th December 1996 on the country MAC
Accident summary sheet. An internal UN controlled demining group report (in Khmer) was
found on file in January 1999. The following summarises its content.
The demining team were clearing land so that an NGO could build a road. There was a
deserted house at the site. The area was densely vegetated and strewn with a large number
of fragments. Victim No.1 was a detector man. His partner cleared some vegetation and then
returned to the rest area. Victim No.1 tested the detector a second time and went to sweep
the area.
At 8:00 the Team Leader heard an explosion and ran towards it. He stated that he saw Victim
No.2 on his back about 15m away from the accident site. He carried Victim No.1 to a safe
area where the medic treated them. Both victims were then taken to Aranyaprathet Hospital in
Thailand, arriving 40 minutes later. The Team Leader returned to the accident site and found
the detector making a constant noise.
Victim No.2 was a supervisor who was inspecting the work. The report gave no further details
but states that the nature of his injuries indicated that he was close to the prodder man at the
time of the accident and then walked to a point 15m away.
The investigators went to the site and found a crater inside the clearance lane measuring
15cm wide and 4cm deep. Around the crater were metal fragments, including four nails 50cm
in front, but there was no evidence that they had been investigated by the victim.
The victim's detector was slightly damaged but was able to be tested, and it was found that it
was not working. The detector was sent to Schiebel for further tests to determine the fault, but
at the time of compiling the report, no result was known.

Victim Report
Victim number: 222

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: US$4,000

Time to hospital: 40 minutes

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Arm
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
A medical report recorded that the accident occurred at 08:00 and the two victims were first
taken to Aranyaprathet Hospital in Thailand where they were stabilised, and then transferred
to Mongkul Borey Provincial Hospital the following day, arriving at 17:00.
Victim No.1 suffered traumatic amputation of both feet and had a large wound on the
underside of his wrist, as indicated on the medical sketch reproduced below.

He left hospital on 18th December 1996 but was scheduled to return for another operation on
20th February 1997. In the meantime the victim would continue to receive treatment at the
country MAC's clinic.
He was awarded $4,000 compensation on 17th March 1997, and received it on 29th April
1997.
On Victim No.1's application for compensation it was mentioned that his monthly salary was
$184.

Victim Report
Victim number: 223

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: none

Time to hospital: 40 minutes

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
minor Eyes
minor Face
minor Hand
COMMENT
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See medical report.

Medical report
A medical report recorded that the accident occurred at 08:00 and the two victims were first
taken to Aranyaprathet Hospital in Thailand where they were stabilised, and then transferred
to Mongkul Borey Provincial Hospital the following day, arriving at 17:00.
Victim No.2 suffered an 8cm gash across the bicep of the left arm, minor multiple fragment
injuries to his face and his eyes were filled with dust and sand. The prognosis was that he
would probably recover fully but that it was too early to be sure about his eyes.
He left hospital on 11th December 1996, fully recovered, and the doctor recommended that he
be allowed to return to work.
At a Compensation Board meeting on 17th March 1997 it was decided to allow Victim No.2 to
return to work but not to award him compensation

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the field
supervisors failed to ensure that the equipment issued was working adequately and allowed
safety distances to be breached. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”
because the detector was not working.
The report contained no record of whether the safety spectacles were worn, but in the case of
Victim No.2 (who was at some distance from the blast) this seems unlikely.
There is some evidence of a management failing by virtue of the detectors having been
known for some time to be inadequate.
The question of punishing Victim No.2 by not paying compensation deserves note. The victim
had paid out of his own salary into a compensation fund and was injured while working. The
responsibility for field discipline rested with the field supervisors and he was one, but the
official punishment of victims in this manner is unique to this demining group.
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